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CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES
S. A. BAYITCH
Conular judicial powers. - Treaties accord to consular 
officers, as
a rule, limited judicial powers to adjudicate, within the 
territory of the re-
ceiving country, certain classes of disputes between 
their own nationals."
Such powers may be exercised by consular officers or 
by consular courts,"
the latter almost a thing of the past.
When acting as a judge, the consular officer is a quasi-judicial 
officer
of the sending state. Thus, he is bound to observe, 
first of all, his coun-
try's conflict law and procedure.'
9 By virtue of provisions enacted in the
sending state, it may occur that these general rules are modified in certain
respects and adapted to their extraterritorial exercise.'
° Such modifications
*This is a continuation of an article, the first portion of which appeared in 8
MIAMI L.Q. 501-529 (1954).
87. 4 HACKWORTH. op. cit. 876 (1942); 1 HYDE, op. cit. 739 (1945).
88. Consular courts survived under the treaty with Morocco (1836), 8 STAT.
484, Art. XX; Cheng, Rights of United State Nationals in the French Zone of
Morocco, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 354, 360 (1953); CAILLE, ORGANIZATION
JUDICIAIRE ET PROCEDURE MAROCAINE, 130 (1948); Laubadere, Les Obliga-
tions Internationales du Maroc Modern, 1 LA TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINCIPES
Du DROIT PUBLIC 315, 322 (1951); Remarques sur le Fondament Juridique 4es
Capitulations Ameaicaines au Maroc, GAZ. TRIB. MAR. Oct. 25, 1948. Cf. the
decision of the International Court of Justice, August 27, 1952, 47 AM. J. INT'L
L. 136 (1953). For a local case, see 47 AM. J. INTQL L. 722 (1953). Consular
courts exercise jurisdiction over disputes between American nationals except in
criminal cases involving assaults against Morrocans; in these cases local courts
retain jurisdiction (Art. 21) and local law applies (2 HACKWORTH. op. cit. 504.
Consular courts in Ethiopia previously acting under the most-favored nation
clause contained in the 1914 treaty (invoking Art. 7 of the treaty between Ethiopia
and France, 1908), have been abolished by the recent treaty with Ethiopia (1951,
Art. XVIII). Nevertheless, by an exchange of letters it was agreed that "all Ameri-
can citizens shall have the right to demand that one of the judges sitting shall
have had judicial experience in other lands." In addition, there is a possibility
of removal of any such proceeding, on motion, to the Ethiopian High Court.
According to the Agreement with Ethiopia concerning the utilization of de-
fense installations (1953, TIAS 2964) Ethiopian courts will retain civil jurisdiction
over members of the United States forces, except in matters arising from the per-
fornance of their official duties (Art. XVII, 3); outside of. this, United States
military authorities will have the right to exercise within Ethiopia all jurisdiction
over its armed forces "conferred on the United States military authorities by the
laws and regulations of the United States" (Art. XVIII, 2).
As to Iran, see 12 Star. 78 (1860), 22 U.S.C. § 183 (1952).
As to jurisdiction and law applicable, see 12 STAT. 76 (1860), 22 U.S.C. §
141 seq. (1952), On the problem of the law applicable, Doted v. Wells, 11 N.Y.S.2d
258 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939); In re Blanchard's Estate, 29 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sur. Ct.
1941); impact of the Constitution, United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.
Cal. 1943); full faith and credit, Newman v. Bash, 89 Misc. 622, 152 N.Y. Supp.
456 (1915).
89. Treaties are silent on this point. It seems only reasonable that consular
officers follow the law of their country, starting from its conflict law. As to con-
stitutional aspects, it may suffice to indicate that such questions may come up
where a foreign consul applies to local authorities for the enforcement of his award
36 STAT.1163 (1911), 22 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1952).
90. See 12 STAT. 73 (1860). 22 U.S.C.. § 14) (1952).
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by the senaing country may be motivated by the need to comply with require-
ments set up by the receiving country as a condition for the privilege of
exercising there some of the sending state's sovereign powers. Such a con-
dition may be established unilaterally by the receiving country, or, it may
have been referred to or agreed upon in a treaty. Finally, rules of general
international law must be observed.
It follows that three sets of laws come into play whenever consular
judicial powers are exercised. First, the treaty establishing the basis for
such adjudication," including general principles of international law; sec-
ond, the law of the sending state which determines, within the limits of
such treaty, the scope of the consular jurisdiction and the manner in which
it is to be exercised;9" and third, the law in force within the receiving
country which will come into operation whenever it applies according to
the treaty, in consequence of a reference or a reservation.
The most important ,class of disputes cognizable by consular officers
contains disputes on board ship flying the flag of the sending country. The
first group of these disputes concerns the internal order representing, in
fact, a limited exercise of police powers by consular officers on board
ship during their stay in ports of the receiving country." The other class
of disputes are justiciable controversies arising out of seamen's contracts
for work. In older type treaties the power to adjudicate such disputes is
granted to consular officials" to the exclusion of local judicial or adminis-
trative authorities." However, this exclusiveness of consular juris-
91. The Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (U.S. 1794); in re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); Dainese v. Hale, 81 U.S, 13 (1875); In re Aubry,
26 Fed. 848 (E.D. La. 1885). Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of
Powers in tbe United States. 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 71 (1918).
92. See 22 CODE FED. RErs. § 128.6 (1951).
93. 4 HACKWORTH, op. cit. 878;' Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886); Ex
parte Anderson, 184 Fed. 114 (D. Me 1910).
94. E.g., Art. XI of the treaty with Norway (1827, 8 STAT. 346) that consuls
"shall have the right, as such, to sit as judges and arbiters in such differences as
may arise betwe'en the captain and crews.. without interference of local author-
ities," The Marie, 49 Fed. 286 (D. Ore. 1892). The treaty with France (1853), Art.
VII) provides that consuls "shall alone take cognizance of differences which may
arise, either at sea or in port, between the captain, officers or crew, without ex-
ception, particularly in reference to the adjustment of wages and the execution of
contracts. The local authorities shall not, under any pretext, interfere in these dif-
ferences, but shall favorably aid... the consuls." Similar examples may be multi-
plied (e.g.. in the treaty with Italy, Art. Xl, 1878; with the Netherlands, Art. XII,
1855i with Greece, Art. XIII, 1902).
it is interesting to note that territorial sovereignty apparently motivated the
provision of the early treaties limiting such activities to board ship; e.g., in the
treaty with France (1788, 1 MALLOY 494) in the sense that consular officers have
"all the power of jurisdiction in civil matters in all disputes" only "on board the
said vessels" (Art. VIII).
Where consular jurisdiction is declared by the treaty to be exclusive local
courts are without jurisdiction; The Cambitsis, 14 F.2d 236 (E.D. Pa. 1926); The.
Bound Brook, 146 Fed. 160 (D. Mass. 1906); The Marie, 49 Fed. 286 (D. Ore. 1892);
The Burchard, 42 Fed. 608 (S.D. Ala. 1890); except there is no consular officer in
the respective jurisdiction- The Amalia, 3 Fed. 652 (D. Me. 1880). But see The
Ester, -190 Fed. 216 (E.D.S.C. 1911). Admiralty Suits Involving Foreigners, 31
TEXAS L. REV. 889, 893 (1953).
See 13 STAT. 121. 22 U.S.C. § 256, (1946).
CONFLICT LAW IN U. S. TREATIES
diction has been modified in part, within the United States, by a statute
(Section 4 of the Seamen Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, 46 U.S.C.
Section 597)', with regard to a specified class of disputes." These dis-
putes, therefore, will be adjudicated by municipal courts having jurisdic-
tion in the matter, and treaty law inconsistent with this amendment is con-
sidered abrogated."1 In a few instances, treaty articles involved have been
terminated by diplomatic notes,' while subsequent treaties are held to
supersede Section 4 of the Seamen's Act.9"
Of late the exclusiveness of consular jurisdiction was further relaxed
by reservations in favor of local jurisdiction. Consular officers are author-
ized to exercise their judicial powers "provided local laws so permit"
(e.g., treaties with Cuba, 1926, Art. XII; El Salvador, 1926, Art. XXI; Fin-
land, 1934, Art. XXV)."" According to the most recent formula, consular
officers exercise judicial powers subject to the proviso that local authori-
ties do not take jurisdiction in a particular case (e.g., treaties with Great
95. Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillion, 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
96. The requirement of reciprocity is imposed in 13 STAT. 121 22 U.S.§. C
256, (1946), by providing that the President" shall have been satislied that simi-
tar provisions have been made for the execution of such treaty by the oher con-
tracting party and shall have issued this proclamation to that effect, declaring this
act to be in force as to such nation." Dallamagne v. Moisan, 179 U.S. 169 (1906);
Petition of Georgakopoulos, 81 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1948), 171 F.2d 886 (3rd
Cir. 1948); The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1938). The effect on treaties of
this statute was never squarely put before courts.
97. The amendment "provides the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions,"
Sanberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 196 (1918), which rule was followed by a ma-
jority of courts; Heros v. Cockinos, 177 F.2d 570 (4th Cit. 1949); Lakos v. Saliaris,
116 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1940); The Menas, 35 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); The
Rindjiani, 254 Fed. 913 (9th Cir. 1919). Contra: The Leonidas, 32 F. Supp. 738
(D. Md. 1940), holding that inconsistency between Art. XII of the treaty with Greece
and § 597 resulted in concurrent jurisdictign (741), all this in spite of the express
abrogation of the treaty, 3 U.S. FOREIGN REL.: 1916 at 41; reliance on The Es-.
trella, 102 F.2d 736 (3rd Cir. 1938), cert. denied 306 U.S. 658 (1939), is misplaced
since in the latter case the situation was different: the treaty with Norway (1932)
was subsequent to the 1915 statutory amendment, and, in addition, the treaty it-
self established concurrent jurisdiction (Art. XXII, "shall not exclude the juris-
diction conferred on local authorities under existing and future. laws") e/. The
Roseville, 11 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Wash. 1935F.
Wage claims not within the purview of- 597, or "where treaty stipulations
exist ... with regard to the rights of the consul and the crew or other matters occur-
ring on the ship, exclusively subject to foreign law, such stipulations are the , law
of the land and must be fairly and faithfully observed," The Taigen Maru, 73 F.2d
922 (9th Cir. 1934).
98. E.g., in relation to France (3 U.S. FOREIGN REL.: 1915 at 3; 1916 at 39,
Greece see note 97, supra). Treaty articles concerning consular Jurisdiction have
been abrogated in toto without taking into consideration that § 597 applies only to
a part of all disputes covered by this type of consular jurisdiction.
99. The Estrella, note 97 supra.
100. The draft for the treaty with Norway (1932) contained the proviso "provided
the law of the vessel's flag be observed." This point was widely discussed and,
finally, the following formulation adopted: !'.. . shall not exclude the jurisdiction
conferred upon the local authorities under the existing or future law" (Art. XXII
U.S. FOREIGN REL., 1928 at 610, 623, 637). An identical formula was adopted in
treaties with Liberia (1938,. Art X), tie Philippines (1947, Art. XI, 1), Costa -Rica
(1948, Art. X, 6), etc.
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Britain, 1951, Art. 21, TIAS 2494; Ireland, 1950, Art. 22).ioi In one treaty,
consular jurisdiction in seamen's disputes even is deprived of its power of
adjudication and reduced to a mere "conciliatory power, without authority
to settle disputes" (convention with Mexico, 1942, Art. X, 57 Stat. 800).
Consular notarial functions. - For reasons of convenience, a different
type of consular function exercised abroad shall be discussed here. Gen-
erally, treaties give consular officers the privilege to perform, within the
receiving country, notarial functions.oi Limiting our discussion to the
question of the law controlling such activities, we find treaties declaring
that the law "of their own country" shall apply. This means that the ex-
tent and the manner of such notarial activities will be controlled, primarily,
but not exclusively, by the law of the sending country. °'0 However, the ap-
plicability of the lex patriae is modified, in many instances, by treaties
limiting the extent of such functions not only in regard to the notarial law
of the lex patriae but also by that of the receiving country; the latter as a
consequence of possible reservations in favor of local law. 10 The most
common limitations are that both or, at least, one of the parties to the
transaction is a national of the sending country, that the transaction is to
be performed, or that the property involved is located within the sending
country."'1 Some treaties even contain a general reservation in favor of
local law to the effect that consular notarial acts must not be prohibited by
the lex loci actus (e.g., treaty with Costa Rica, 1948, Art. VIII, 1,b)106
101. "The consular officer may, provided the judicial authorities of the terri-tory do not take jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of Art. 22, decide
disputes between the master and members of the crew, including disputes as to pay
and contracts of service, arrange for the engagement and discharge of the masterand members of the crew... "; "the judicial authorities may, however, exercise
any jurisdiction which they may possess under the law of the territory with regard
to disputes as to wages and contracts of service between the master and membersof the crew," which would preserve, at the pleasure of our courts, the applicability
of § 597.
102. 4 HACKWORTII, op. cit. 838 (1942); 2 HYDE, op. cit. 1361 (1947); HarvardResearch in International Law, Legal Position and Functions of Consuls, 26 AM.J.
INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1932).
103. E.g., treaties with Austria, 1928, Art. XVIII; Belgium, 1880, Art. X; Costa
Rica, 1948, Art. VIII; Cuba, 1926, Art. XI; El Salvador, 1926, Art. XXI; France,Art. VI, 2; Germany, 1923, Art. XXII; Great Britain, 1951,Art. XVII;Greece, 1902,
Art. IX; Mexico 1942, Art. VII; the Philippines, 1947, Art. VIII; Spain, 1902, Art.
XXII; uhzosiayia. 1881. Art. X.
104. See 22 CODE FuD. REoS. § 136.4 a (1952).
105. ". ... or the property involved is situateawithin the territory of the sending
state" (Art. XXII, 3 of the treaty with Spain, 1902; Art. XXII of the treaty withGerm soy)106. "the recent treaty with Costa Rica is an example of the trend toward in-
creased limitations; in addition to the requirement that such acts may be requested
only by nationals of the sending country to be used outside of the receiving coun -
try, such functions may be performed only if required "by any person for the use in
the territory of the sending state or are rendered in accordance with procedures,not prohibited by the laws of the receiving state, established by the sending state
for the protection of its nationals abroad or for the proper administration of its laws
and regulations" (Art. VIII, 1, b).
According to Art. XVII (3) of the convention with Great Britain f1951) consular
officers may exercise certain notarial functions "in any case where these services
are required by a person of any nationality for the use in the sending state or under
the law in force in the sending state." The treaty with the Philippines (1947)add4
the proviso that such documents "are intended to have application, execution and
legs effect principally in the territory" of the sending country (Art. VIII, 1 d); sim-
ilar proviso in the treaty with Mexico (1942, Art. VII, d).
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The performance of consular notarial activities is, as a rule, limited to the
consular premises except where treaties allow such activities to be
conducted in some other place (e.g.. treaty with Greece, 1902, Art. X;'7
with Cuba, 1926, Art. X.'o'
All these limitations must be read into the statutory provision that
United States consular officers are "required... to perform any notarial
act which any notary- public is required or authorized by the law to do with-
in the UnitedStates" (22 U.S.C. Section 1195).' °0
What law will determine the effect of consular notarial acts presents a
different question. The rule generally adopted by treaties is that such acts
"shall have the same force and effect as if drawn by and executed before a
notary public or other public officer"
0 ° duly authorized in the country by
which the consular officer was appointed" (e.g., treaty with,Spain, 1902,
Art. 22; Sweden, 1910, Section 10; Germany, 1923, Art. XXII; Cuba, 1926,
Art. X1, 2; Norway, 1928, Art. XVII). Consequently, consular notarial acts
are granted, within the receiving country, the effect of notarial acts exe-
cuted in the sending country and not the effect of local notarial acts. Thus,
a locally executed consular notarial act will retain in the receiving country,
in spite of the treaty privilege authorizing such activities, the stain of
alienage. Their intrinsic'effect will be, consequendy, determined according
to "the laws and regulations of the country where they are designed to take
effect" (treaty with Cuba, 1926, Art. XI, 2)"
1 which includes the law of
the receiving country as well. This complete reservation in favor of the
law of the country where the act is "designed to take effect" is, with re-
spect to the receiving country, modified only insofar as additional privi-
leges are granted by the treaty. For example, in the receiving country, con-





Consular officers may execute notarial acts "for the use elsewhere,"
outside of the sending country; i.e., in the receiving or even in a third
107. " . .. at their offices, at their private residences, at the residences of the
parties, or on board ship."
108. "... at any appropriate place."
109. See 22 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 136.4, 9 (1952).
110. In some countries acts required to be in notarial form may be validly execu-
ted by court officers in non-contentious proceedings, e.g., authentication of signa-
tures, execution of wills, etc.
ill. See 22 CODE FEn. REGS. § 136.6 a (1952). The rule discussed is express-
ed in the treaty with the Netherlands (1878, Art. IV) that such "acts shall be..
subject to the provisions of the law on this subject, however, in the two countries."
The treaty with Cuba (1926) contains a clear formulatioh, namely that "such
documents shall have been drawn and executed in conformity to the laws and regu-
lations of the county where they are designed to take effect" (Art. XI, 2); a simi-
lar provision is inserted into the treaty with Philipines (1947, Art. VIII, 2), but it
is omitted in the convention with Costa Rica (194$)
112. ".... shall be received as legal documents in the courts of justice through-
out the United States and Greece" (treaty with Greece, 1902, Art. X 2); '" . . shall
be received as evidence... as original documents and shall have the same force
and effect as if drawn by and executed by a notary... " of the sending country
(treaty with Cuba, 1926, Art. XI, 2).
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country. "But it is understood," reads a recent treaty (with Great Britain,
1951, Art. XVII, 2), "that this provision (concerning consular notarial func-
tions in connection with documents required by a national of the sending
state for the use elsewhere) involves no obligation on the authorities of
the receiving state to recognize the validity of notarial acts performed by
a consular officer in connection with documents as required under the law
of the receiving state."
International commissions. - The settlement of private claims by im-
ternationally created bodies invested with adjudicating powers is a matter
to be discussed in international law. Nevertheless, a few remarks seem to
be appropriate at this point of the present discussion to indicate jurisdic-
tional questions and problems of the law applicable.'"
In peace treaties, commissions have been set up to adjudicate private
claims arising in connections with such treaties. After 1919, Mixed Arbi-
tration Tribunals went into action according to peace treaties of 1919, in
relation to the United States called Mixed Claims Commission (agreement
with Germany, 1922, IS 655)." 4 Similar provisions are contained in the
ireaties of peace concluded in Paris (1947), e.g., the Conciliation Commiss-
ion according to Art. 83 of the treaty of peace with Italy."'
An important international commission with powers to adjudicate pri-
vate claims was established in the General Claims Convention with Mex-
ico (1923, 43 Stat. 1730)." The Commission adjudicated claims of Ameri-
can nationals "according to the best of his judgment and in accordance
with international law, justice and equity" (Art. 1). Such method of settl-
ing private claims against a foreign government complies with the general
principle proclaimed in the Convention for the arbitration of pecuniary
claims (Buenos Aires, 1910, 38 Stat. 1799), where contracting countries
agreed "to submit to arbitration all claims for pecuniary loss or damage
which may be presented by their respective citizens and which cannot be
amicably adapted through diplomatic channels....," the decision to be
"rendered in accordance with the principles of international law" (Art. I).
Treaties entered into under the authority of the Economic Cooperation
Act, 22 U.S.C. Section 1501 et seq. (1948), contain provisions regarding
jurisdiction over claims by American nationals for compensation for "gov
ernmental measures affecting his property rights, including contracts with
113. Lipstein, Conflict of Laws be/ore internationat Tribunals; 27 "'1RANSAC
TIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY (1942).
114. Laves, The United States - German Claims Settlement 1921-1927, 20 ILL.
L. REV. 787 (1927); KIESSELBACH, PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION (1936); Bludorn, Le Ponctlonnement et la Jurisprudence des
Tribunaux Mixtes Crdes par les Traitds de Paris, 41 RECUEIL DES COURS
(HAGUE) II, 141 (1932).
115. fomke, Settlement of Dispute Provisions in Axis Satelite Peace Treaties,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 911 (1947).
116. See 63 Stat. 972 (1949), 22 U.S.C. § 661 seq. (1952); note also the second
1923 treaty as well as agreements entered into later (1934, 1938); FELLER, THE
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1935).
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or concessions from such country" (Sec. 1513, 6, 10). Insofar as espoused
by the Government, such claims shall be decided by the International Court
of Justice or by "'any arbirral tribunal agreed upon" (id.). Subsequent
treaties extended this provision to treaty aliens. In the Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement with France (1948, TIAS 1783), for example, the rule has
been made applicable to analogous claims by French nationals after they
have "exhausted the remedies available to (them) in the administrative and
judicial tribunals of the country in which the claim arose" (Art. X, 2).
Claims arising out of nationalizations are now handled according to the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 12, 22 U.S.C. Section
1621 et seq.)."'
Finally, brief mention should be made of private claims against foreign
governments or its nationals espoused by the Government and settled by
international agreements. These agreements become the law of the land and
claims are settled by an act in the nature of legislation."
Private arbitration agreements. - Some of the recent treaties"' intro-
duced a new topic into our treaty law: rules concerning agreements to arbi-
trate and the effect to be given arbitral awards.""0 All these treaties have
one requirement in common. In order to benefit from treaty law, arbitration
agreements must show diversity of nationality of parties involved, in the
sense that these agreements have been entered into between nationals or
117. Surrey, Arbitration under the Marshall Plan, 4 ARB. J. 8 (1949); Benoits,
Accord Bilateral de Cooperation Economique Franco-Americaine et Adhesion de la
France d la Disposition Facultative Reconeaissant la Jurisprudence de la Cous
lnternationale de Justice, CHRONIQUE DALLOZ 21 (1949).
Rode, The International Claims Commission of the United States, 47 AM. J.
INT'L I 615 (1935)-
118. In Hennevig v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 743 (1949), the Court of Claims
dismissed the claim of a national of Norway of the ground that its jurisdiction 'has
been effectually withdrawn." Since the claim was settled by the Claims Convention
with Norway (1940) the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1952), applies that"claims
growing our of or depending upon a treaty entered into with foreign nations" are
outside of the Court s jurisdiction. Cf. Insurance Co. of North America v. United
States, 121 F. Supp. 649 (1954).
119. Treaties containing provisions ,nprivate arbitration: with China, 1946, Art.
VI, 4, TIAS 1871); with Italy (Supp. treaty, 1951, Art. VI, 25 Dept. State Bull. 568,
1951); Ireland, 1950, Art. X; Colombia, 1951, Art. V, 2; Greece, 1951. Art. VI, 2;
Denmark, 1951, Art. V, 2; Israel, 1951, Art. V, 2, and Japan, 1953, Art. iV, 2, TIAS
2863. As it appears now, only three treaties have been ratified (with China, Israel,
Greece and Japan).
120. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration; International and Interstate Aspects,
43 YALE L.J. 716 (1934); Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration, a Test
of International Private Law Legislation. 56 HARV. L. REV. 219 (1942); Macassey,
International Commercial Arbitration, Its Origin, Development and Importance, 24
TRANSACTION OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 179 (1938); Balladore-Pallieri, L'Ar-
bitrage Prive dans les Rapports Internationaur 52 RECUEIL DE, COuRS (HAGUEl)
I, 291 (1935); Carabibier, Le Development de 1' Arbitrage Commerciale Internation-
ale. 3 REvuE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 205 (1950); Schonke,
Der Gegenwartige Stand und der Weitere Ausbau der Internationalen Scbiedsgericbts-
barkit in Zivil-and Handelssacben, 3 SUDD. JUR. ZTG. 186 (1948); RIEZI.ER.
INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 595 (1949).
For documentation. NUSSEAUM, INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK ON CIVIL
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1928); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD (1951).
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corporations of "either Party and nationals and companies of the other
Party". The important question of susceptibility to arbitration (arbitrability)
of the claim involved is not settled by treaty law; only one treaty (with
China) makes a mention of "any controversy susceptible of settlement by
arbitration" without indicating the controlling law. It would follow that the
question remains controlled by the applicable municipal law. The same
rule applies with regard to formal requirements, for example, that the agree-
ment to arbitrate be in writing. It is again the treaty with China where the
question is not only touched upon but answered. According to this treaty,
a "written agreement for arbitration" is required. This can only mean that
a mere oral agreement to arbitrate, even if sufficient under the lex loci
actus, will not bring such agreement within the coverage of the treaty.
Whether or not an agreement to arbitrate will be specifically enforced,
depends upon the law of the court where such remedy is sought. It is to be
pointed out, however, that the prevailing majority of treaties imposes no
duty upon contracting countries to assure such enforcement. On the con-
trary, in all these treaties (with Ireland, Colombia, Greece, Denmark, Italy,
Israel, Japan, and excepting only China) municipal law on this point re-
mains unaffected, except for two rather unimportant grounds which may
justify denial of such enforcement under municipal law. One of these
grounds, intended to be eliminated by treaty law, is the fact that the arbi-
tration proceedings should take place abroad,", while the other ground to
be removed is based upon the fact that '.the nationality of one or more of
the arbitrators is not of such other Party;'-1 i.e., of the country in whose
courts the agreement is sought to be enforced, a ground unknown to our law.
It follows, that all other grounds against granting specific performance, as
in force under the applicable municipal law, will remain available under
this type of treaty, including the common law doctrine of revocability.
There is, however, one treaty where a different attitude has been adopted;
the treaty with China prescribes that "such agreements shall be accorded
full faith and credit by the courts within the territories of each High Con-
tracting Party", i.e., in the country where the agreement to arbitrate was
entered into as well as in the other contracting country.
Whether or not an arbitral award rendered in one contracting country
121. Maybe a reflex of The Silverbrook, 18 F.2d 144, (E.D. La. 1927), holding
that federal courts are " . . . without jurisdiction to direct parties to proceed to arbi-
tration... because the place and the manner of arbitration prescribed by the con-
tract are beyond the jurisdiction of thisicourt . . . " "This court cannot direct and
otherwise supervise an arbitration.to be held in London." Recent statutory changes
prompted the court (International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 93
F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1950), to declare that "the law is well established that a pro-
vision for arbitration outside of the United States. . . is valid. .. (which) follows
directly from the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
122. "The Committee (on Foreign Relations of the Senate) was informed that
there have been cases in which courts have been unable to give effect to arbitra-
tion provisions because of domestic requirements relating to the nationality of the
arbitrators (and) of the place where the arbitration occurs" (Report of the Committee
Concerning the Treaty with Ireland, 1951, 81st Congress, 2d Sess., Exec. Rep't 8).
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will be entitled to enforcement in the other, depends upon the law appli-
cable according to the other country's conflict rules. Treaties, with two
exceptions to be discussed later, do not endeavor to change this state of
municipal law. The only change introduced by treaties consist in abolish-
ing, within the coverage of treaty law, two possible grounds for denying
such enforcement. Those two grounds we already have encountered as
grounds to be eliminated with regard to the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, namely the fact that the arbitration took place abroad and that
one or more of the arbitrators were aliens (treaties with Ireland, Colombia,
Denmark and Israel). As in the previous situation, only these two grounds
to deny enforcement of awards are declared ineffective, provided, of course,
they are part of the controlling municipal law. Consequently, all other
grounds preventing the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards will remain
in force unimpaired, even in situations where such foreign awards are "final
and enforceable under the law of the place where rendered" (treaties with
Ireland and Colombia)."' Such finality under the municipal law of the place
where the award was rendered will be taken into consideration only inso-
far as this fact is decisive under the applicable municipal law.1'
Two treaties (with Greece and Japan) go one step further and impose
upon contracting countries the duty to enforce arbitral awards rendered in
the other contracting country. This duty is conditioned upon the fact that
that awards are "final and enforceable under the laws of the place where
rendered." Then, they are "entitled to be declared enforceable by such
courts" (i.e., of competent jurisdiction of the other contracting country),
unless, "contrary to public policy." When all these conditions are com-
plied with, the award rendered in the other contracting country will have
the effect of "awards rendered locally," except in the United States. Here,
arbitral awards rendered in Greece or Japan "shall be entitled in any
court in any State only to the same measure of recognition as awards ren-
dered in other States thereof," a treatment comparable, to the internal
foreigner treatment discussed above.' All by itself, in this respect, stands
123. The supplementary treaty with Italy, 25 DEPT STATE BULL. 568 (1951),
repeating the reference to the place of arbitration and alienage of arbitrators, adds:"It is understood that nothing herein shall be construed to entitle an award to be
executed within the territories of either High Contracting Party until after it has
been duly declared enforceable therein" which only restates that law as it is ac-
cording to treaties of this type. The provision apparently takes into account the
strict provisions of Italian law (Art. 806 seq., Code of Civil Procedure). Sperl, Die
Buagerlicben Scfiedsgericbte nacb dem Rechie der ltalienischen Zivilprozes-
sordnung votm 28. Oktober 1940, 16 ANNUARIO DI DIDITTO COMPARATO 52
(1943); Marmo, Gli Arbitrati Stranieri e Nazionali con Elementi di Estranieta 19
ANNUARKO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO 1 (1946); Vassia, International Commercial
4rbiaration from the Italian Viewpoint. 4 ARn. J. 27 (1947); Racca,Enforcement in
Italy of Awards between Americans and Italias, 6 ARB. 1. 235 (1951).
124. Which cannot surprise in view of the 'fact that arbitral awards are, with re-
spect to recognition, still better off than foreign judgments, treaty-wise.
125. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, Enforcement of Foreirw Awards, 45
YALE L.J. 39 (1935); Domke, On the Enforcement Abroad of American Arbitration
Awards. 17 LAW & CONTEMP P9O. 545 (1952); Stern, The Conflict of Laws in"
Commerical Arbitration, id. at 567 (1952); Heilmann, The Enforceability of Foreign
Awards, 3 AiRB. J. 183 (1939).
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the treaty with China. There, an arbitral award within the coverage of the
treaty is given "full faith and credit by the courts within the territories of
the High Contracting Party in which it was rendered." At a glance, it ap-
pears that this provision refrains from granting arbitral awards any effect
in the other contracting country. At the most, it would seem that this pro-
vision will supersede local law if it should discriminate against arbitral
awards because of diversity of nationality of the parties involved, a rule
without any significance in this country.'
A different aspect of arbitration is regulated in the Warsaw Convention
(1929), namely the arbitrability of claims arising out of international air
transportation in the sense of Art. I of the Convention. In a general way,
Art. 32 denies any effect to "clauses contained in the contract and all
special agreements... altering the rules as to jurisdiction,"'- including
agreements to arbitrate. This prohibition, however, is qualified by two far
reaching exemptions. On the one hand, it does not affect claims arising out
of international transportation of goods, regardless of the time when the
agreement to arbitrate was entered into (before or after "the damage ocpur-
red"), provided such arbitration "is to take place within one of the juris-
dictions referred to in the first paragraph of Art. 28", i.e., first, within the
territory of one of the contracting countries, and second, at the option of
the plaintiff in one of the jurisdictions there enumerated.' On the other
hand, agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of transportation of per-
sons will be "allowed," provided such agreements have been entered into
after the "damge occurred." The same limitations on jurisdictions as to
where arbitration of claims involving transportation of goods is "allowed"
to take place, probably apply also to claims arising out of transportation of
persons. All arbitration is, according to an express provision, "subject to
this Convention". Thus, the arbitrators cannot deviate from the law laid
down by the Convention. Consequently, an award rendered in violation of
the liability provi sions of the Convention will be open to attack in court
as "null and void."
An important share in settling private disputes is allotted to private
126. Art. 1fl of the first draft for an interamerican convention on international
law of sales (see note 86, supra) provided, in its "procedural article" (70), that
courts shall have jurisdiction "in all controversial questions resulting from the
application of this law... ", unless the parties have agreed "to submit their differ-
erences to the courts of a specific country" (Pan American Union, DRAFT UNI-
FORM LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY,.
1953).. The "Provisional Draft of Buenos Aires" (1953) ado pted, however, a dif-
ferent formulation: "...provided parties have not, by mutual consent stipulated
the judges, courts or arbitrators at some other place" (i.e., outside of the place of
performance, see note 86, supra), thus throwing together, in a rather casual way,
prorogation, venue and agreements to arbitrate.
Note, Comite Juridico Interamericano, PROYECTO DE LEY UNIFORME
SOBRtiARBITRAJE COMERCIAL.INTERNACIONAL (1954).
127. GOEDHUIS, op. cii. 312.
128. See 8 MIAMI L.Q. 527.
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arbitration under the Agreement concerning German external debts (London,
1953, TIAS 2792).1 "2
It remains only to mention that the interamerican system of arbitration
established according to the Resolution XLI of the VlIh International
Conference of American States (Montevideo, 1933) is "entirely indepen-
dent of official control.""0 Its proceedings and awards are, therefore, gov-
erned entirely by the municipal law applicable.
VIII
LAW IN TIlE U.N. HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT
Conflict problems of a particular nature arise out of the fact that the
United Nations maintains its seat in this country. They are regulated in
the Agreement between the United States and the United Nations regarding
the headquarters of the United Nations (1947, TIAS 1676).'"1 In evaluating
this Agreement, it is to be kept in mind that the United States did not re-
nounce its sovereignty (nor the sovereignty of the State of New York) over
the headquarters district (Art. I, Sec. 1, a). The United Nations Organiza-
tion has been granted only what is cautiously termed "control and authority
...as provided by this Agreement" (Art. III, Sec. 7,a),, meaning that the
United States retains the plenitude of powers inherent in its sovereignty
minus powers specifically conferred upon the United Nations under the
Agreement. In principle, the only constitutional and legislative powers to
129. For disputes under Annex IV parties may agree to submit their disputes to
an arbitral tribunal (Court of Arbitration) which will determine its own procedure;
in absence of such determination the "Arbitration Code of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce shall apply" (Art. 32, 7 of the Agreement). Arbitral tribunals are
provided also in Annex I1 (Art. IX) and in Annex III (Sec. 20); Annex IX contains a
charter for such tribunals.
Arbitral awards are enforceable, irrespective of reciprocity, through German
courts and authorities (Art. 17, 3, a, of the Agreement), provided the claim involved
falls under the Agreement. A German court may refuse to enforce an arbirral award
(except if rendered by an arbitral tribunal established in accordance with the Agree-
ment) if the arbitral tribunal proceeded without an agreement of the parties con-
cerned, if defendant was not afforded the opportunity to defend his case, or where
the award "would be contrary to public policy in the Federal Republic of Germany"
(Art. 17, 4 of the Agreement).
Regarding the validation of dollar bonds of German issue, arbitration boards
will be set up (Art. 6 of the Ordinance, annexed to the Agreement with Germany,
1953, TIAS 2793; Art. 35 of the German law for the validation of foreign currency
bonds, 1952), the United States consenting that these boards "exercise their juris-
diction within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" (Art. 3 of the Agree-
ment).
130. Domke and Kelor, W estern Hemispbere System of Commercial Arbitration,
6 UNIv. TORONTO L.J, 307 (1946); Domke, Inter-American Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 4 NIAmI L.Q. 425 (1950); Goico, Evolucion del Arbitraje Comercial en
America. 21 REVISTA DE LA SECR. DE ESTADO.. .(Dominican Republic) 14
(1952); Barrios de Angelis, El Arbitraje en America, 3 REVISTA DE LA FACUL-
TAD DE DERECHO (Montevideo) 767 (1952).
131. Liang, The Legal Status of the United Nations in the United States, 2
INT'L L.Q. 577, 595 (1948); Brandon, The Legal Status of the Premises of the
United Nations. 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1951, 90, 96 (1952); JENKS. THE HEAD-
QUARTERS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1945),
Brandon (loc. cit. 97, 98) calls the Agreement "extremely important", "unique"
and "unprecedented."
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be exercised within the headquarters district remain those belonging to the
United States (including powers of the State of New York and municipali-
ties); federal, state and local courts retain their jurisdiction, and federal,
state and local laws apply within the district, except "as-otherwise pro-
vided by this Agreement."
Restricting our discussion to the choice-of-law problem involved, it is
to be observed that conflicts of this kind may arise only insofar as the
United Nations Organization is authorized to create its own law binding
also upon the courts of the land. This privilege was granted by the Agree-
ment as the"power to make regulations" (Art. II, Section 8).it Consequent-
ly, the United Nations may enact rules supplementing or even modifying the
otherwise applicable municipal law. In the latter situation, the courts will
be faced with the question as to what law, the municipal law or rules err-
acted by the United Nations, shall, control. To cope with such situations,
the Agreement prepared a carefully edsigned scheme intended to guarantee
to the United Nations the privilege to create leyal rules within the United
States and, at the same time, to have such rules applied in the courts of
the land. The obligation to follow rules made by the United Nations is im-
posed upon the courts of the land by specific provisions of the Agreement
(courts "shall take into consideration" such regulations, Art. III, Section
7, d: regulations "shall apply" and local law "shall be inapplicable"
Art. Ill, Section 8).
To be binding upon the courts of the land, state as well as federal
and local, regulations enacted by the United Nations must be made "for the
purpose of establishing therein (within the headquarters district).conditions
in all respects necessary for the full execution of its functions" (Art. III,
Section 8) as these functions are defined by the Charter or expressly con-
ferred upon the United Nations under the Agreement (Section 13, f).1 It
follows that in order to be binding upon the courts of the land as rules of
law, regulations of the United Nations must be justified by the scope of the
United Nations in general, and by necessities imposed upon the United
Nations in its actions within the headquarters district in particular. There-
fore it is understandable that the applicability in the courts of such enact-
ments is, under the Agreement, limited to "cases arising out of or relatirng
to acts done or transactions taking place in the headquarters district",
over which matters, it may be added, domestic courts retain complete and
132. According to a resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations (1950), all regulations under § 8 of the Agreement must be submitted to
the General Assembly for approval except in specific instances (YEARBOOK .OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 179 (1950), According-to the Yearbook for 1951 (at 855),
three such regulations are in force: first, concerning social security; second, re-
garding qualifications for professional and other special services within the dis-
trict; and third, a regulation concerning operation of services within the district.
133. Giving the United Nations the "exclusive right to authorize or prohibit en-
try of persons and property into the headquarters district and to prescribe the con-
ditions under which persons may remain or reside therein'.', with no 'residuary'
powers for the United States.
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exclusive jurisdictioni4 (".. .shall have jurisdiction over acts done and
transactions taking place in the headquarters district, as provided in ap-
plicable federal, state and local law," Art. III, Section 7, c, except, of
course, "as otherwise provided in this Agreement", e.g., with regard to
service of process, seizure of property, etc.).
It appears that not only is the regulation-rmaking power of the United
Nations itself limited to effects to be achieved within the headquarters dis-
trict ("regulations operative within the headquarters district, for the pur-
pose of establishing therein conditions...," Art. III, Section 8), but their
applicability in the courts of the land in relation to the otherwise appli-
cable municipal law is likewise restricted to matters situated in the head-
quarters district ("operative within the headquarters district", "applicable
within the headquarters district"; vice versa, local law shall be "inappli-
cable in the headquarters district", Art. III, Section 8) insofar as such
facts constitute the respective cause of action. It follows that the United
Nations regulations, even if not ultra vires in the sense of the Charter, will
not be enforced by the courts of the land where the facts of the case arise
out of occurrences outside of the' headquarters district.135 Outside of the
district the control of municipal law remains exclusive and complete.",'
134. The United Nations Organization has no power to establish, within the.
headquarters district, its own judicial system to adjudicate cases arising there, in-
sofar as such cases are, according to the applicable federal, state and local law,
within the cognizance of the courts of the land. Therefore, no conflict of judicial
jurisdictions may arise between the United Nations and domestic courts. Where
certain classes of disputes, cognizable by domestic courts, may be settled, in ac-
cordance with the applicable federal, state or local law. Qut of court by private set-
tlement of any kind, sdich settlements by instrumentalities of the United Nations
fvill probably be held legil and given the effect they have under municipal law.
135. The statement by Brandon (loc. cit. 98) that "although the locus contractus
of transaction made within the premises and the locus delicti committed therein, is
indeed the United States, the law applicable thereto will depend upon the existence
of a (United Nations) regulation" appears to be questionable since the controlling
law is, in principle, the municipal law, the applicability of which does not depend
upon a United Nations regulation.
136. Brandon (loc. cit. 98) takes the position that the limitation "to apply with-
in the headquarters district" does not exclude "the power to make regulations in
respect ;o transactions having the situs, but not necessarily to be performed within
the premises", i.e.. within the headquarters district. It is quite correct to say that
the United Nations Organization is entitled, being an independent entity of inter-
national law, to issue regulations (or anly other type of commands) to be observed
anywhere. The duty ofi observance, including sanctions for violations, are limited to
persons who consented to be bound by this type of rules. However, the point dis-
cussed here is a different one, namely, whether or not such Unked Nations regula-
tions will be binding upon the courts in the United States as rules of law supersed-
ing the otherwise applicable municipal law. As it was stated above, the courts .ill
apply to all occurrences outside of the district the normally applicable municipal
law since, according to an express provision of the Agreement, municipal law may
become inapplicable only "in the headquarters district," the word 'in' meaning not
that courts will have to refrain from applying municipal law when sitting in .the
district, but in the sense as defined in § 7 (d), Art. il of the Agreement, ie., to
cases "arising out of or relating to acts done or transactions taking place in the
headquarters district." It follows that the contact established by the fact that a
transaction originated in the district will not become an exclusive contact indicat-
ing the law applicable making the United Nations regulation the perpetual lex
causae to control exclusively the relationship so-initiated and its later develop-
ments.
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Thus the area of possible conflicts between United Nations regula-
tions and municipal law is restricted in two respects: by the scope of the
United Nations to be effectuated within the headquarters district" and by
the strict territorial contact determining their applicability in the courts of
the land. In case of a conflict between both bodies of law, United Nations
regulations are given, according to the Agreement, precedence over munici-
pal law to the extent that the otherwise applicable "federal, state or local
law or regulation of the United States" will become "inapplicable" inso-
far as it is "inconsistent with a regulation of the United Nations author-
ized by this section" (Art. Ill, Section 8). In this situation, three prelimi-
nary questions will have to be decided: one, whether the case arises out of
an occurrence within the headquarters district; second, whether the United
Nations regulation is "authorized by this section"; and lastly, the fact and
extent of the inconsistency between the otherwise applicable municipal law
and the United Nations regulation. The power to try and decide the first
question remains with the courts of the land, while the second and the
third issue cannot be adjudicated by a domestic court having jurisdiction
of the case. The power to decide whether or not the United Nations has the
authority to make such a regulation and whether or not such regulation is
inconsistent with municipal law, is conferred upon an arbitral tribunal pro-
vided in Section 21 of the Agreement."3' On these two points its decision
will be conclusive upon the domestic courts (Art. 21, b). "Pending such
settleio'nt", i.e., before the arbitral tribunal gives its opinion, the posi-
tion taken by the United Nations will be binding upon the courts in the
sense that municipal law cannot be applied, to the extent as claimed by
the United Nations to be inconsistent with its regulations. This also im-
plies the additional presumption, in favor of the United Nations, that the
regulation involved is authorized by the Agreement.
IX
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
It is generally accepted that questions of judicial procedure are gov-
erned by the lex fori. This rule is restated in a few conventions, e.g., in
137. In United States v. Kenney, III F. Supp. 233, 235 (D.C. 1953) thecourt
stated, "Manifestly, this is a limited authority (of the United Nations to legislat
for the area within the geographic boundaries of the seat of the United Nations, or,
as it is called in the treaty, the headquarters district .... This authority, of course,
cannot affect any activities or any matters that occur outside of this area" since-
the United Nations "is not clothed with the power to legislate on matters in the
realm of municipal law of the United States. This proposition is axiomatic'andhi j '
be stated without disparaging or detracting from the tremendous importance and
vital significance of this international orgamization."
138. A similar method of deciding preliminary questions is adopted in the Agree
ment between the parties to -he NATO regarding the status of their forces (1951).
According to Art. VIII (8) -..e question whether an act was done in the performance
of official duty (including use of ay vehicle) will be submitted to an arbitrator
(Art. VII, 2., b) whose decision will be final. ive.
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the Convention concerning trade-marks and names (Santiago, 1923, 44
Stat. 2494, "in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding ... the pre-
cepts of the procedure of that State shall be observed." Art. V, Section
1), and in the Warsaw Convention (1929), "questions of procedure shall be
governed by the law of the courts to which the case is submitted", (Art.
28, 2).",9
The question of access to courts, already discussed, is to be distin-
quished from the question as to who is entitled to bring an action, a ques-
tion to be decided according to the conflict law of the forum. In this con-
nection it may be noted that the Warsaw Convention (1929) intentionally re-
frained' from adopting a specific rule in this respect. The Convention
only stipulated that any action for damages (Art. 17, 18 and 19) may only
be brought "subject to the conditions and limits set out in this conven-
tion," but "without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights"
(Art. 24), thus reserving all procedural and substantive issues involved to
the law applicable according to the lex fori.''
On powers o/ attorney, there is for the most part only uniform substan-
tive and procedural law to be found in the inter-american Protocol on uni-
formity of powers of attorney (1940, 56 Stat. 1376); powers issued accord-
ing to the Protocol shall be given "full faith and credit" (Art. V); as to
the attestation of such powers "the law of the respective country" is de-
clared controlling (Art. 1, 1). 142
139. As to the jury, Ulen v. American Air Lines, 7 F.R.D. 371 (1947).
At the present time, minimum procedural standards are established by treaties
only for criminal proceedings, e.g., Art. V (1) of the treaty with Italy (1948); Art.
II of the treaty with Uruguay (1949); Art. I1 (2) of the treaty with Ireland (1950)-
Art. II1 (2) of the treaty with Denmark (1951); Art. 11I (2) of the treaty with Israel
(1951). Minimum procedural guarantees are assured also in Art. It (9) of the Annex
of the status of the United States personnel and property in Iceland (1951, 2 UST
1534) and by Art. VII (9) of the Agreement between the parties to the NATO (1951).
140. The reporter on the draft of the convention stated (GOEDHUIS, op. cii.
269): "The question has arisen of whether it should be determined who are the
persons who may bring an action .... It has not been possible to find a satisfactory
solution to this double problem and the CITEJA has considered that this question
of private international law should be regulated independently of the present Con-
vention."
141. In Komlos v. Companie Internationale Air France, Ill F. Supp. 393 (S.D.-
N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cit. 1954), the court found
that "the Convention has left open the question as to whether the. lex fori or the
lex loci delicti should determine which person or persons has the right-of action
created by the Convention, if there is a conflict of law between the lex foci and
the lex loci in that respect" and applied the Klaxon doctrine, 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
142. Treaties grant litigants expressly the right to appear in courts by their
representatives to be chosen freely (e.g., treaties with Bolivia, 1858, Art. 13;
Paraguay, 1859, Art. II, 3; China, 1946, Art. VI, 4), assuring national (e.g., treaty
with Haiti, 1864, Art. 6) or or-favored-nation treatment (e.gt, treaty with Italy,
1948, Art. V, 4).
As to counsel acting within leased areas, see Art. VII of the Agreement pro-
vid'ing for lease of naval and air bases (1940, 54 STAT. 2405), and Art. VIII of the
Agreement concerning the Bahama long range providing ground (1950, TIAS 2099),
both with Great Britain. In relation to Canada, the admission of attorneys to prac-
tice before patent offices is settled in an Arrangement (1937, 52 STAT.(1475).
Eder, Powers o1 Attorney in International Practice, 98 U. OF PAL. REV.840
(1950).
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Like procedure, rules of evidence are part of the lex fori. This rule is
followed in the Convention for protection of submarine cables (Paris,
1884, 24 Stat. 989); according to Art. IX (1), evidence "may be obtained
by all methods of securing proof that are allowed by the laws of the country
of the court before which a case has been brought.""'14
Lex fori also governs compliance with letters rogatory5 In relation to
the United States only two international agreements are in force at the
present time. One is in force with regard to the Soviet Union (exchange of
notes, 1935, 49 Stat. 3840)'-- advising that such letters be presented to the
Soviet Union through diplomatic channels while Soviet letters rogatory will
be submitted through their consuls in the United States. A strong reserva-
tion in favor of the Soviet lex fori is made to the effect that Soviet courts
"shall give effect to them (letters rogatory) in accordance with the pro-
cedural rules obtaining in the U.S.S.R." (p. 6 ) and that compliance may be
denied "if the execution thereof would affect its sovereignty or safety."
A similar reservation is incorporated in the Agreement regarding pecuniary
claims with Yugoslavia (1948, 62 Stat. 2658) stating that the Yugoslav
government will "permit in a manner consistent with the Yugoslav law, the
taking of such witnesses as may be requested by the Government of the
United States" (Art. 9).L'
According to common law the statute o/ limitations is part of the pro-
cedural law of the forum. This rule appears not to be affected by treaty
law, and the lex fori remains undisturbed except where treaties create
uniform rules regarding the period required, as, for example, according the
Convention establishing uniform rules with respect to assistance and sal-
vage at sea (Brussels, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658), or the Warsaw Convention
143. The Warsaw Convention contains additional provisions concerning prima
facie evidence (in the authentic French text "tjusqu'a preuve contraire" or" sauf
preuve contraire") in Art. 11 (1, 2) and Art. 26 (1). The question of burden of proof
is regulated in Art. 20 (1) and 21, the latter allowing the defe'nse of contributory
negligence. In consequence, local law requiring the plea of freedom from contri-
butory negligence will be superseded by treaty law; the effect to be given such de-
fense, if successful, will be governed, according to the Convention, by local law,
since the court may "exonerate" the carrier wholly or partly "in accordance with
the provisions of its own taw" (Art. 21).
144. Taracouzio, International Cooperation of the U.S.S.R. in Legal Matters, 31
AM. J. INT-L L. 55 (1931); The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1941) involving
testimony to be taken in Estonia.
145. Direct intercourse between iudicial and administrative authorities is es-
tablished in Art. XIV of the Convention of the international recognition of rights
in aircraft (1948; see XIII, 1, b, infra), "subject to any contrary provision in their
national law." a complete reservation in favor of local law.
On judicial assistance, Jone's, International Procedure in Civil and,Criminal
Matters, Recent Developments in the United States, THIRD CONFERENCE .OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, LONDON 1950, 257 (1952); same, International Judicial
Assistance: Procedural Chaos andd Program for Reform. 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953);
same, International judicial Assistance, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 365 (1953).
For recent developments, Pan American Union, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY
OF LEGISLATION ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN JUDICIAL PROCED-
URES (1952); draft convention in HANDBOOK OF THE SECOND. MEETING OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, BUENOS AIRES, 25 (1953).
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(199) where an equal period of two years is established after which
"the right to damages shall be extinguished" (Art. 29, 1).' 6 Closely con-
nected are provisions dealing with the question of what law governs sus.
pensions and interruptions of this period. The Brussels Convention pro-
vides that the lex fori controls the "grounds upon which the said period of
limitations may be suspended or.interrupted are determined by the law of
the court where the case is tried" (Art. X, 2).'7 The same rule applies ac-
cording to the Warsaw Convention (1929) that "the method of calculating
the period shall be determined by the law of the Court seized of the case"
(Art. 29, 2), as well as under the Convention on the international recogni-
tion of rights in aircraft (Geneva, 1948, TIAS 2847) providing that as to the
period to bring an action under Art. IV, the "law of the forum shall deter-
mine the contingencies upon which the three months period may be inter-
rupted or suspended" (Art. IV, 4, b).'4'
Treaties of peace (1919 and 1947) contain provisions concerning pre-
scription; however, the United States refrained from ratifying them.'
4 , 
ISO
146. Sheldon v. Pan American Airways, 74 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
147. "That article gives the United States as the forum of this controversy the
right to determine grounds upon which the two year period of limitations may be
suspended; and it permits but does not require the United States to provide for
extension of the period where it has not been possible to arrest the salved ves-
sel .. . ", United States on behalf of Lord Comm'r for Executive Office of Lord
High Admiral v. The James L. Richard, 82 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Mass. 1949).
148. An interesting provision is contained in the Agreement concerning German
external debts (London, 1953, TIAS 2792). Debtors cannot invoke "the expiration
of a periol of prescription or of a preclusivt period of limitation" which provis-
ions (with added qualifications) apply regardless of whethei' "the periods have
been established by German or other law, by order of a court, of an arbitral body or
of an administrative authority, by contract or other legal act" (Art. 18, 1, 5). Germ-
anY promised to apply this rule in its courts "even though the obligation is one
which, as to its content, is governed by foreign law." It appears that, in this way,
German courts will be prevented from following their established practice of charac-
terizing statutes of limitations as part of the substantive law applicable as lex
causae (let us say: of the proper law of the contract) and not as part of the pro-
cedural lex fori. Consequently, German courts will apply, for the purposes of this
Agreement, the treaty provision concerning statutes of limitations as if it were a
generally applicable rule of the lex fori superseding any other lex causae.
149. Salvoni v. Pilson, 181 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
150. Regarding the United States, there is no treaty law in force concerning
bankruptcy; thus, municipal conflict law controls. Nadelmann, The National Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws. 59 HARV. L. REV. 1025 (1946); same Re-
vision of Conflict Provisions in the American Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L & COMP.
L. W. 484 (1952); Bursler, Bankruptcy Reciprocity, a Study as to a Treaty with Can-
ada, 33 A.B.A.J. 1026 (1947). On international cooperation in this matter, Nadel-
mann, Bankruptcy Treaties. 93 U. OF PA. L. REV. 56 (1944); same, International
Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 324 (1950); Plaisant, Los
Tratados en Materia de Quiebras en Derecbo Internacional Privado, 5 REVISTA
ESPA'&OLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 13 (1952); GIULIANO, ILL FALLI:
MENTO NEL DRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE (1943). For




Recognition. - Dicta in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), indicate
that the requirement of reciprocity may not apply where there is an inter-
national treaty on recognition of foreign judgments,,, However, treaties of
this kind, with the United States as a party, are rare indeed.
One group of treaty provisions concerning recognition of foreign
judgments is contained in treaties of peace of 1919 and 1947, Only one
such provision originally inserted in the Treaty of Versailles was in force
with regard to the United States (according to the treaty restoring friendly
relations, Berlin, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939) - namely Art. 302 (1), obligating
Germany to recognize as final all judgments rendered by the courts of
Allied countries which, under the present treaty, they were competent to
decide, and enforce them without "necessity of any executory decree."
As to judgments rendered during the war, by German courts against Allied
nationals, such nationals were entitled, in case they had "suffered preju-
dice" in consequence of. such judgments, to a compensation to be deter-
mined by the Mixed Arbitration Tribunals (Art. 302, 2). If possible, such
compensation was to be given by securing a restitutio in integrum; i.e.,
"replacing parties in the situation which they occupied before the judg-
ment was given by the German court" (Art. 302, 3)-"
In the Paris treaties of peace, this strict rule imposing unilateral
recognition of judgments was abandoned. It will be enough, for the present
purposes, to mention the treaty with Italy (1947, 61 Stat. 1245). It provides
(Annex XVII, 13) that the Italian government "shall take the necessary
measure to enable nationals of any of the United Nations ... to submit the
appropriate Italian authorities for review any judgment given by an Italian
court" provided such national was "unable to make adequate presentation
of this case either as plaintiff or defendant." The Italian government, on
its part, undertook to provide in cases where such national "has suffered
injury by reason of any such judgment" that he shall be "restored in the
position in which he was before," or "shall be offered such relief as may
151. Reese, The Status in This Country of judgments Rendered Abroa4 50 COL.
L. REV. 782 (1950); Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American judgments Abroad,
29 YALE L.J. 188 (1919); Speri, La Reconnaissance et l'Execution des Jugements
Etrangers. RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague), 11, 385 (1931)- On treaty law, Verbeek,
Die $taatsvertage Aber die Vollstreckung auslandischer Zivilurteile, 45 NIEM.
ZTSCIIR, INT. RECHT 1 (1931); JELLINEIC, DIE ZWEISEITIGEN STA.'.sSvtnT
RAGE OBER ANERKENNUNG AUSLZNDISCHER ZIVILURTEILE (1953).
Cooper, Recognition of Foreign Judgments under Art. XV of the -' rotposed Re-
vision of the Rome Convention, 17 J. Air L. & Comm. 212 (1951). Nadelmann, Los
Estados Unidos de America y los Acuerdos sobre Ejecucion Reciproca de Senten-
cias Extranjeras, 4 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO
47 (1954).
152. Department of State, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER (1947).
153. Mowitz, The Execution of Foreign Judgments in Germany, 81 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 795 (1933); Gernsheim, Art. 302 V.V. und die Vollstreckbarkeit Aus-
ltndischer Urteile in Deutscbland, 58 J.W. 417 (1929); Feller, die Vollstrert-kbar-"
keit von Urteilen Amerikanischer Gericbte in Deutscbland, 60 J.W. 112 (1931).
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be just and equitable in the circumstances."
Another provision in the nature of treaty law dealing with recognition
of foreign judgments, this time rendered by courts within the United States,
appears in the Litvinov Assignment (November 16, 1933). s4 According to
this Assignment the Soviet government agreed not to make any claims with
respect to certain classes of judgment as specified in the Assignment.
Enforcement. - The procedure of enforcing judgments, domestic as
as well as foreign, is governed by the lex fori."'1 This rule is adopted by
the Convention on the international recognition of right in aircraft (Geneva,
1948, TIAS 2847) by providing that "The proceedings of the sale of an air-
craft shall be determined by the law of the Contracting State where the
sale takes place" (Art. VII, 1). The same lex fori will determine the
"consequences of failure to observe the requirements" as established by
the convention regarding the notice of such sale, the documents to be
submitted by the creditor and the required notifications (Art. VII, 3) as
well as the costs legally chargeable to the proceeds (Art. VII, 6)."
Questions relating to seizure are dealt with in the convention for the
protection of industrial property (London, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748) regarding
goods illegally bearing a trade-mark."' Such seizure may be effectuated
in the country where the mark or name was illegally applied, or in the
country to which the article has been imported; if the municipal law of
such country does not allow seizure at this point, it shall be replaced by
prohibiting the importation or by seizure within the country.' There these
measures are not available under municipal law, they will be "replaced by
the remedies assured in such cabcs to nationals by the law of such coun-
try" (Art. 9).'" 0
The privilege of exemption from seizure is considered in the Conven-
tion on international civil aviation (Ciicago, 1944, TIAS 1591). Aircraft
registered in one of the contracting countries engaged in international nay-
154. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
155. Foreign judgments concerning debts within the Agreement on German ex-
ternal debts (London, 1953, TIAS 2793) will be enforced through German courts and
apthorities (Art. XVII, 1), reardless of reciprocity, except in situations listed in
paragrarb (4) pf the saxpe AFrticle (sge soge 129 sura).
In situations not involving entorcement of foreign judgments ("in any other
proceeding respectin,# a debt which has been the subject of a final decision ren-
dered by a court... in a credifor country... ") German courts are bound by find-
ings of facts by foreign courts, unless the debtor introduces evidence to the con-
trary. In this case the creditor is entitled to present "rebutting evidence including
the transcript of evidence in the former proceeding" (Art. XVII, 3, b of the Agree-
ment).
156. For a full discussion, see i"Ira Xlm.
Treaties concerning technical cooperation contain provisions exempting funds
granted under such agreements from local "garnishment, attachment, seizure, Qr
other legal process by any firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government"
(e.g., with Saudi Arabia, 1953, Art. 4, TIAS 2845).
157. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY 574, 581 (1930); the infringement to be decided "by the law of the country
where the act takes place."
158. See 22 U.S.C § IZ4 (1952).
159. See Art. 5 ie,. ot the 1925 Convention.
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igation and passing through the territory of another such country are exempt
from seizure or detention if such seizure is to be made on the ground of an
infringement of patent, provided both countries are also parties to the Con-
vention for the protection of industrial property, or both have patent laws
which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions made by nation-
als of the other parties to the Chicago Convention (Art. 27).
Lastly, a treaty provision prohibiting the enforcement of an otherwise
effective judgment should not be overlooked. According to the Agreement
between the parties to the NATO regarding the status of armed forces
(London, 1951) a member of a force' or civilian component "shall not be
subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given
against him in the receiving state in a matter arisihg from the performance
of his official duties" (Art. VIII, 5, g).160
X!
TORTS
Personal injuries. - It appears that one of the frequent provisions to
be found in treaties is the one promising to treaty aliens "the most con-
stant protection and security ... of persons and property" referring, some-
times, to general principles of international law, or granting treaty aliens
national treatment ("... shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and
privileges as are or shall be granted to natives on their submitting them-
selves to the conditions imposed upon the natives", treaty with Italy,
1871, 17 Stat. 845, Art. Ill, 1). This treaty with Italy is significant since it
served for decades to come as the proving ground for testing old and draft-
ing new formulations. It all started when the Supreme Court, construing Art.
Ill (1) of the treaty rather narrowly, found that the protection under the
treaty is not available to claimants residing abroad.' This ruling brought
160. Compared with foreign iudgmenis, foreirn tax claims are. accordin, to
treaty law, better off by far; International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 CoL.
L. REV. 490 (1950).
161. Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 275 (1908): "If an Italian
subject sojourning in this country, is himself given all the direct protection af-
forded by the laws to our own people, including all rights of action for himself or
his personal representatives to safeguard the protection and security, the treaty is
fully complied with, without going further and giving to his nonresident alien rela-
tives a right of action for damages for his death, although such action is afforded
to native resident relatives, and although the existence of such action may indirec-
tly promote his safety."
Later, in McGovern v. Philadelphia & Dearing Ry,., 235 U.S. 389, 399 (1919),
the Supreme Court pointed out that in the Maiorano case it applied local law as
construed by the highest state court [-Deni v. Pennsylvania R.R., 181 Pa. 525, 27
At. 558 (1897) . The Maiorano doctrine was followed in Funco v. Schuylkill Stone
Co., 169 Fed. 98 (3rd Cir. 1909), and in De Biaso v. Normandy Water Co., 228
Fed. 234 (D.N.J. 1915). The majority of courts, however, preferred to follow Mul-
hall v, Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 17 S.E. 387 (1900); cf. Burgess v. Gilchrist, 17 S.E.
2d 804 (W.V. 1941).
Andrews, Discrimination Against Non-resident Dependents, 13 AI. LAB. LEG.
REV. 232 (1925); Comment, Position of Aliens under the Modern Compensation
Laws, 11 MINN. L. REV. 57 (1927); Hyde and Watson, The Equities of Nonresident
Alien Dependents under Workmen's Compensation Laws. 7 ILL. L. REV. 414 (1931);
Tellier, Right to Maintain Action for Wrongful Death /or the Benefit of Nonresident
Aliens, 138 A.L.R.A. 684 (1942).
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about an amendment to Art. III of the 1871 treaty (1913, 38 Stat. 1669) 162
providing, on the one hand, that rights "shall not be restricted on account
of nationality" of claimants (without expressly eliminating the requirement
of residence), and introducing, on the other hand, new difficulties by limit-
ing the cause of such "civil responsibility" to cases of "negligence or
fault." This restriction was held controlling in another Supreme Court de-
cision. 0
Out of such trial and error method, a third version emerged which be-
came the standard provision for treaties entered into in the between-the-
wars period (1923-1941). The provision reads:
With respect to that form of protection granted by National, State
or Provincial laws establishing civil liability for injuries or
for death, and giving to relatives or heirs or dependents of an
injured party a right of action or a pecuniary benefit, such rela-
tives or heirs or dependents of the injured party, himself a na-
tional of either High Contracting Party and within any of the ter-
ritories of the other, shall regardless of their alienage or resi-
dence outside of the territory where the injury occured, enjoy
the same rights and privileges as are or may be granted to na-
tionals, and under like conditions...
and is now adopted, among others, in treaties with Germany (1923, Art. II),
El Salvador (1926, Art. II), Estonia (1925, Art. II), Honduras (1926, Art. 11),
Norway (1928, Art. I), Liberia (1938, Art. I) and China (1946, Art. XII).
In analyzing this type of treaty law, it should be noted at the outset
that it creates no new liabilities nor does it extend benefits to persons not
already entitled, at least in a general way, to such benefits under mu-
nicipal law. The only change to be effectuated by this type of. treaty
law is to secure to persons claiming under an injured or dead, a non-dis-
criminatory treatment regardless of their alienage or lack of residence in
the country the law of which they invoke. In order to secure such treat-
ment, treaties plug their provisions into one of the contacts" 4 used in
municipal law to describe its own coverage. One such contact is the in-
162. Discrimination against a resident alien was held in violation of the treaty
with Italy and the XIVth Amendment in Vietti v. Geo. K. Mackie Fuel Co., 109 Kan.
179, 197 Pac. 881 (1921).
163. Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926), followed in Modonna v. Wheeling
Steel Co., 28 F.2d 710 (4th Cit. 1928); Frasca v. City Coal Co., 116 Atl. 189 (Conn.
1922); Norella v. Maryland Casualty Co., 216 Ky. 29, 287 S.W. 18 (926). Distin-
guished in Antosz v. State Compensation Com't. 43 S.E.2d 397 (W.Va. 1947); c/.
Micaz v. State Compensation Com'r, 13 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1941).
It may be added that the 1871 treaty with Italy, as amended in 1913, was termi-
nated by mutual consent in 1937. Now, Art. XII, of the 1948 treaty is in force; for
the intermediate period, Burgess v. Gilchrist, 17 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1941).
164. In Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 74 Sup. Cr. 535, 539 (1954) the
Supreme Court added to the already accepted terms of 'contact' (International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 1945)and connecting factor, (Laurit-
zen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 1953) a new one: 'conductor' (" ... some juris-
dictional fact or event to serve as a conductor.").
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jured himself through his nationality or residence; the second is the plact
of injury; and the third is the nationality or residence of the claimant. As
to the injured, treaties require generally that he be "a national of either
High Contracting Party and within the territory of the other."1 The last
provision, however, appears obscure. It may be interpreted to mean that the
injured must be a resident of the 'other' country, or it may be construed that
the place o( his injury must be within the 'other' country. If we read the
addition in the sense that it contains a mere reference to self-evident cir-
cumstances, then it will appear that no new requirement as to the place of
injury has been added. If, on the other hand, we interpret this addition to
mean that the injury must have taken place within the 'other' country, then
only injuries suffered by treaty aliens within the 'other' country will be
covered by this type of treaty law. If the first submitted construction is
followed, then the applicability of the law of the 'other' country will be the
decisive factor, and not the place of injury, as long as the same law con-
trols (as a consequence of its extraterritorial application). ' Additional
support in favor of this construction my be seen in the fact that in a few
recent treaties (e.g., with Liberia, 1938, Art. II; China, 1946, Art. XIII) an
express limitation has been introduced requiring tht such "national was
injured within the territories of the other (country)." This support will be,
of course, effective only if it can be shown that the newly adopted language
is intended to be at variance with the previous formulation. At least, it may
be safely stated that under the newly styled provision, there will be no
doubt that treaty law does not apply in cases where the injury occured out-
side of the territory of the 'other' country, regardless of the fact that its
law still may be applicable. Insofar as the claimant is concerned, it is sur-
prising to find that he may be of whatever nationality and reside in any
place outside the 'other' country.
Lately this type of treaty law underwent four important changes: one
assures the injured himself of the most-favored-nation treatment (e.g., Art.
XII, 1 of the treaty with Italy, 1948, regarding "laws and regulations...
that (a) establish civil liability for injury and death, and give a righ: of ac-
tion to an injured person, or to the rlatives, heirs, dependents or personal
representatives as the case may be"); the second requires that claimants
must be of the same nationality as the injured (id.); the third extends na-
tional treatment to injuries or death on account of occupational diseases;
165. Under this type of treaty law, the injured himself may be discriminated a-
gainqt under the applicable municipal law. This was changed, as it will be shown,
in the treaty with Italy (1948, Art. XIl).
166. The place of injury is referred to in connection with the residence of the
claimant. However, this cannot decide the question discussed above since such re-
fereoce merely indicates that such claimant may invoke the law of the 'other' count-
try even if he is not personally, i.e., in the territorial tense, subject to such law.
In addition, it may be pointed out that there is no ground for the argument that
this type of treaty is intended to curtail the extent to which the law of the 'other'
country applies; this would mean that the law of the 'other' country will be ap-
plied extraterritorially, even in situations controlled by this type of treaty law,
in situations analogous to Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. industrial Accident
Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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and the last to be noted grants national treatment with regard to benefits
flowing from an "established system of compulsory insurance" (e.g., treaty
with Italy, 1948, Art. XII, 2; Ireland, 1950, Art. IV).,'
It is interesting to note that the traditional treaty rule regarding civil
liability is rapidly fading away. In the treaty with Uruguay (Art. III) the
rule is reduced to one covering occurrenres arising out of and in the course
of employment or due to the nature of employment, including, of course,
benefits under social insurance (followed in treaties with Denmark, 1951,
Art. IV; Israel, 1951, Art. IV; Colombia, 1951, Art. IV; Greece, 1951, Art.
XI; Japan, 1953, Art. llI).
Brief mention should be made of two treaties containing additional
conflict rules on torts. One is the Convention on the international recogni-
tion of rights in aircraft (Geneva, 1948, TIAS 2847) dealing with injuries or
damages caused on surface within the country where the forced sale of the
aircraft takes place (Art. VII, 5); the other is the Agreement with Great
Britain concerning the Bahamas long range proving ground (1950), reaffirm-
ing the lex loci damni rule. 16,
Damage to ptoperty. -There are but a few scattered provisions in
point. 1 ' One of them is to be found in the Declaration (1886) related to the
Convention for the protection of submarine cables (Paris, 1884, 24 Stat.
989). The notion of what is "civil responsibility" as between owners of
cables for damages caused by cables to cables (Art. IV of the Convention)
167. According to Art. X1 of the Convention concerning the liability of shipowner
in case of sickness, injury, or death of seamen (International Labor Conference,
1936, 54 STAT. 1693) reads that " .,. national laws or regulations relating to bene-
fits under this Convention shall be so interpreted and enforced as to ensure equal-
ity of treatment to all seamen irrespective of nationality, domicile or race." Cf.
United Stares v. Robinson, 170 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1949); Robinson v. United States,
177 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1949).
Leroque, International Problems of Social Security, 66 INT'L LAB. REV. 1
0952).
168. See 8 MIAMI L.Q. 510, supra. The Agreement with the Philippines concern-
ing military bases (1947, TIAS 1775) has no conflict rules as to the law applicable
in connection with civil liability established in Art. 23.
In Art. 19 (3) of the Agreement with Ethiopia (see note 88, supra) the United
States agreed to pay compensation for cla'ims "cognizable under United States
foreign claims laws, of inhabitants of Ethiopia for damage to, loss'or destruction of
property, or for injury or death, caused by members of the United States. All such
claims will be processed and paid in accordance with the applicable provisions of
the laws of the United States." See 31 U.S.C. § 224(d) seq. (1954).
169. Art. 28 of the Convention on commercial aviation (Havana, 1928, 47 STAT.
1901), now superseded (Art. 80 of the Chicago Convention, see note 209, in/ra),
provided expressly that damages "to persons or property loLated in the subjacent
territory shall be governed by the law of each State," probably the lex loci damni.
For a discussion of conventions in preparation, see Shelley, The Draft Rome
Convention Irom the Standpoint of Residents and Other Persons in This Country,
19 J. AIR. L. & COMM. 289 (1952); Wilberforce, Convention on Damages Caused
by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 9
(1953); Davis, Surface Damage by Foreign Aircraft, the United States and the New
Rome Convention, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 570 (1953).
Claims arising out of torts not connected with the performance of official
duties ate regulated in Art. VIII (6, 7, and 8) of the Agreement between the parties
to the NATO (1951).
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will be decided by courts "conformably to their laws," i.e., according to
the law applicable in the court where such case is tried."" Another provi-
sion is contained in the Convention for the recovery and return of stolen or
embezzled motor vehicles, trailers, airplanes or component parts of any of
them (with Mexico, 1936, 50 Slat. 1333) stating that a request for recovery
must be accompanied by documents "legally valid" in the United States
(Art. 1, 1) and vice versa (Art. II) meaning that the validity of such docu-
ments will be tested according to the law of the issuing country. Finally,
lex loci damni controls according to the Convention with Canada concern-
ing questions of indemnities arising from operation of the smelter at Trail
(1935, 49 Stat. 3245). The tribunal adjudicating such claims "shall apply
the law and practices followed in dealing with cognate questions in the
United States of America as well as international law and practice" (Art.
IV), the United States being the place where the impact occured.1"
Damage to intangible goods-A few treaties contain conflict rules re-
garding infringement of patents and trade-rirarks, as well as rules relating
to unfair competition.'
The Convention for the protection of patents, inventions, designs and
industrial models (Buenos Aires, 1910, 38 Stat. 1811) declares that the lex
loci delicit and the lex loci damni controls prosecution of such infringements
by providing that they "shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance
with the laws of the country wherein the offense has been committed or
damage occasioned" (Art. IX). The lex loci deliciti with regard totrade-
marks is controlling according to Art. Vll'of the Convention concerning the
protection of trade-marks (Buenos Aires, 1910, 39 Stat. 1675). The owner of
a protected trade-mark has the right, according to Art. 7 of the Convention
for trade-marksand commercial protection (Washington, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907)
"qto employ all the means, procedure or recourse provided in the country in
which such interfering is being used or where its registration or deposit is
being sought."
Unfair comtpetition, defined as "every act of competition contrary to
honest practice in industrial or commercial matters" (Art. 10 bis Conven-
vention concerning protection of industrial property, Hague 1925, London,
170. The Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to collissionat
sea (Brussels, 1910) was signed, but not ratified by the United States, and is now
withdrawn from the Senate; United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370, 374
(2nd Cit. 1951). The applicability of the Convention as part of the Belgian law is
considered in Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Steward & Sons, Ltd.,
336 U.S. 386 (1948).
171. Kuhn, The Trail Arbitration, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1938), and 35 AM. J.
INT'IL L. 665 (1941); Department of State, Trail Smelter Arbitration between United
States and Canada (Arbitration Series, No. 8, 1941). Note additional agreements
(1949, 1950, TIAS 4635); GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGti CASES 830
(1951).
172. Regarding infringement of copyright, the treaty with China (1946) should be
mentioned. Art. IX imposes upon contracting countries the duty to provide for an
"effective meredy... by civil action," which provision shall not be construed, ac-
cording to the Protocol (5, 6) to "preclude remedies by other than civil action"
provided such remedies are available under municipal law.
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1934) makes it an obligation on the part of the countries signatory to the
Convention to establish "legal remedies to repress effectively" such
practices. As to the right to bring an action, the Convention imposes upon
countries the obligation to permit "syndicates and associations" to prose-
cute such practices "so far as the law of the country in which protection
is claimed permits it" (Art. 10 ter).
Many recent bilateral treaties contain provisions concerning monopo-
lies and competition,,' but no conflict rules are annexed (e.g., with Uru-
guay, 1949, Art. XIV, 3; Ireland, 1950, Art. XV, 1; Denmark, 1951, Art.
XVIII, 1; Israel, 1951, Art. XVIII, 1).- ' 4
XII
CONTRACTS
Commercial transactions. -Treaties of friendship, commerce and n avi-
gation contain, as a rule, a provision granting "freedom of commerce."'
l s
The right of treaty aliens to engage in commercial activities in the other
country may be unqualified or it may be limited to commerce between the
two countries. 17'6 In both cases, such treaty aliens may enter into contracts
of any kind connecied with this type of business,"' especially sales con-
tracts, complying with the l6cal law applicable.1"0 Such reference to local
law is contained in many treaties, e.g., in the treaty with El Salvador
(1926) permiting treaty aliens "to carry on every form of commercial activi-
ty which is not forbidden by the local law... submitting themselves to all
local laws and regulations duly established" (Art. I). In some treaties the
171. Lubin. United States Proposes United Nations Action on Cartels, 25 DEP T
STATE BULL' 590 (1951); Wilson, Methods of Inter-American Cooperation in the
Control of Monopolies, 10 FED. BAR. J. 290 (1948).
174. In the Economic Cooperation Agreements (e.g., with France, 1948, TIAS
1783) the respective foreign countries undertake to take measures "to prevent, on
the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business parctices affecting
international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster
monopolistic control," which practices are listed in the Annex to the Agreement (3),
patterned after Art. 46 of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion (,948).
174. Wilson, Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States, 43 AM. J. INT'L
L. 262 (1949).
175. See note 177, injra.
176. Lorenzen, Uniformity Between Latin-America and the United States in the
Rules of Private International Law Relating to Commercial Contracts, 15 TULANE
L. REv. 165 (1941).
177. The word 'commercial' is defined in the minutes of interpretation of the
treaty with Ireland (1950) as not extending to the "field of navigation, aviation,
communications or public utilities. It relates, though no exclusively, to the buying
and selling of goods and activities incidental thereto."
178. The long history to unify the law of international sales cannot be recounted
here (RABEL, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, IN LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 34, 1951). however, a few re-
marks relating to the recent Provisional Draft of Buenos Aires (1953, see note 86,
supra) seem to be advisable. The Draft contains, of course, mostly uniform sub-
staritive law designed to regulate international sale of movables, provided two
conditions are met: one, in the nature of a territorial diversity of parties to the
sale ("located, at the time they reach agreement, in the territories of different
MIAMI LAXV QUARTERLY
right to engage in commerce is granted treaty aliens according to national
treatment (Art. 3 of the treaty with Brazil, 1828, "submitting themselves to
the laws, decrees and usages, there established, to which native citizens
or subjects are subjected") or under the most-favored nation clause (treaty
with Costa Rica, 1851, Art. 1II). Furthermore, in some treaties the right to
undertake specific transactions connected with commerce is secured, e.g.,
the right to manage businesses personally (treaty with Bolivia, 1858, Art.
7: "it shall be whole free to all merchants... to manage themselves their
own business", Brazil, 1826, Art. 6; Costa Rica, 1851, Art. VII; Paraguay,
1859, Art. IX), declaring treaty aliens engaged in commerce legally cap-
able of entering into commercial transactions without the need of any local
go-betweens. There are even provisions securing the right of free bargain.
ing for prices, tied in with a reference to local law ("absolute freedom
shall be allowed in all cases to the buyer and seler to bargain and fix the
price of any goods... as they shall see good, observing the laws and es-
tablished customs of the country," e.g., treaty with Argentina, 1853, Art.
VIII; Costa Rica, 1851, Art. VII; Paraguay, 189, Art. IX, 3). In some
cases, treaties guarantee imported goods nondiscriminatory treatment,
mostly according to the most-favored-nation clause. Such treatment is to
be given not only with regard to customs, taxes and similar administrative
matters, but generally "with respect to all laws and regulations affecting
the sale or use of imported goods within the country" (e.g., treaties with
Guatemala, 1936; Switzerland, 1936; Venezuela, 1939).
One treaty, moreover, contains a restatement of the time honored rule
'pacta sunt servanda' (with Ethiopia, 1951, Art. VIII, 1), imposing upon
the contracting countries the duty to "assure that their (nationals') lawful
contractual rights are afforded effective means of enforcement, in conform-
ity with the applicable laws," the last phrase containing a reference to the
law applicable according to local conflict rules.'" ISO
States"; query; signatories to the Convention?), and the other, in the nature of
territorial diversity of goods or payments involved ("the goods sold or the price
thereof will be transferred... from the territory of the State in which they are
located, to the territory of another State"; query the same). Treaty law as created
by the Convention is intended to supersede local law ["the application of the
general laws of each State in those matters it (the Convention) expressly gov-
erns" . This leaves, among others, one important question unanswered, i.e., may
parties, in accordance with the law of the forum, choose some other law to apply?
flayitch, La Auionomia de las Partes eu la Eleceion del Deaecbo Applicable ....
7 BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO COMPARADO DE MEXICO 41, 55
(1954). Cf. Conference de la Haye de Droil Iternational Prive, I AcTES Ds LA
7e SESSION .... (1951), 16 seq. (1952).
179, 180. The Agreement concerning German external debts (London, 1953,
TIAS 2792) contains elaborate provisions on renegotiating certain classes of Ger-
man prewar contracts. Within the framework of the Agreement the law governing
such contracts remains the law applicable according to the conflict rules of the
contracts remains the law applicable according to the conflict rules of the forum,
except where the Agreement prescribed creates its own conflict rules. This is the
case where the debtor invokes hardship (Art. 11 of the Annex IV); then relief should
be "in accordance with the concessions where the debtor has been or may be grant-
ed by a German creditor on similar grounds under German Law, especially under the
legislation for the Relief of Debtors (Vertragshilferecht)." This means that the
otherwise applicable lex causae will be superseded by German law. For another
similar provision, see note 148, supra.
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Financial transactions. -Financial transactions in the sense of " inter-
national payments and transfers of funds effected through the medium of
currencies, securities, bank deposits, dealings in foreign exchange or
other financial arrangements, regardless of the purpose and nature of such
payments and transfers" (Art. XV, .5 of the treaty with 'Uruguay, 1949),
are gaining in importance since 1945. However, no conflict rules are
added; instead, general standards are set up, as, for example, national
most-favored-nation, or equitable treatment. a,,
There is, however, one specific treaty provision concerning exchange
contracts (Art. V111, 2, b of the International Monetary Fund Agreement,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401) which reads as follows:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member, maintained or imposed consistently with this Agree-
ment, shall be unenforceable in the territory of any member.
Almost every term used in this provision is open to doubt; this makes
courts cautious in applying this rule,-2 and writers prone to discuss all
possible implementations.~' Difficulties start with the term of "exchange
contract" and are aggravated by theadded qualification that the contract has
to "involve" the currency of a member to the Agreement. Once it isestab-
lished that the contract is an exchange contract and it does involve the
currency of a member country, then the law of such country (lex monetae)
relating to its exchange restrictions will become, according to the Agree-
ment, the lex causae specialis of the contract, superseding any other con-
tact, decisive under the conflict law of the forum. Thus, every contract in
the nature of an exchange contract involving the currency of a member
country to the Agreement, will be, as to its enforceability in any of the,
181. Schwarzenberger, Tbe erovince and Standards of International Economic
Law, 2 INT'L L.Q. 402 (1948).
182. Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Cermak
v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. CC. 1948); Perutz v. Bohemian
Discont Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, i1 N.E.2d 6 (1953); In re Sik's Estate, 129 N.Y.S.2d
134 (Surr. Ct. 1954). Cf. Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd., 1 All. E.R. 811 (1948),
aff'd 2 All. E.R. 621 (1949); Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, 2 All. E.R.
671, 1025 (1949).
Friedman, Foreign Exchange Controls in American Courts, 26 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 97 (1951); Comment, Use of Bretton Woods Agreement on Enforcement of
Foreign Currency Restrictions by American Courts, 53 COL. L, REV. 747 (1953).
183. For a comprehensive discussion, Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Con-
tracts Alter the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867 (1953);
also Campenhout, International Monetary Fund Agreement and Foreign Exchange
Control Regulations. 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 389 (1953); MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT
OF MONEY 378 (2d ed. 1953); same, Private internatioal Law of Exchange Con.
trots under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
97 (1953); Nussbaum, Exchange Controls and the International Monetary Fund4 59
YALE L.J. 395 (1950); same, MONEY IN THE LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL 449 (1950); Comment, The Treatment of lbreign Exchange Controls in the
Conflict of Laws. 34 VA. L. REV. 497 (1948); Gold, i/Application des Statuts de
Fond Monetaire par les Tribunaux, 40 REVUE CRITIQUE 511 (1951). For com-
arative materials, see I.M.F., Staff Papers (from 19 1 on); on German ,Domke,
Ar Auslandsanwendung Deutschen Depisenrechts, Juristenzeitung 484 (1954)
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member countries, tested against the exchange controls enacted in the
country whose currency is involved."" It follows that exchange contracts
will be denied enforceability if found to be contrary to the exchange con-
trols of the country whose currency is involved, provided, such unenforce-
ability is decreed by the law of the same country.1' 5
Employment contracts.'-One group of treaty provisions concerning
labor law assures treaty aliens of the right to hire personnel for their
business "regardless of nationality" (treaty with China, 1946, Art. 11, 2;
Italy, 1948, Art. 1, 1, c, etc.). In some of the recent treaties this rule is
spelled out in more detail, e.g.. in the treaty with Uruguay (1949, Art. V,
4) which permits the engagement of "technical experts, executive person-
nel, attorneys, agents and other specialized employees of 'their choice,
regardless of nationality." This exemption from the municipal law impos-
ing restrictions as to employment of aliens is pointed out expressly in the
treaty with Colombia (1951), decidring inapplicable, with regard to iden-
tical classes of employees, "laws regarding the nationality of employees"
(Art. VII, 3). Much stricter in this sense seems, for example, the treaty
with Greece (1951) permitting the hiring of similar classes of employees
only "among those legally in the tountry and eligible to work" (Art. XII,
4), a provision probably intended to constitute a reservation in favor of
local law.
From early times, there are a few treaties still in force providing that
there is no obligation upon treaty aliens to employ other employees than
those employed by nationals and not for different salaries (e.g., treaties
184. Same result was reached in the official interpretation, I.M.F., ANNUAL
REPORT 82, 1949; 14 FED. REG. 5208 (1949), 1 .. . such contracts will be treated
as unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law of the
forum, the law under which the foreign exchange controls are maintained or imposed
is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its performance."
185.'The question as to whether or not official interpretations of the Agree-
ment, 14 FED. REG. 5208 (1949) (see note 184, supra), are conclusive upon courts
in private litigations involving some provision of the Agreement, is to be found in
a proper reading of Art. XVIII of the Agreement referring only to disputes "arising
between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund;" which
language does not extend the power of such 'authentic interpretation' by the Ex-
ecutive Directors to cases not involving relations between the Fund and its mem-
bers or members of the Fund. Contra, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development v. All American Cables and Radio, F.C.C. Docket it 9362..
186. GIBSON, ALIENS AND TI-E LAW 119 (1940); Kohler, Legal Disabilities
oL Aliens in the United States, 16 A.B.A.]. 113 (1930); Comment, Costitutiosality
of'Legislative Discrimination against the Alien and His Right to Work, 83 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 74 (1935); Fellman, The Alien's Rigb to Work. 22 MINN. L. REV.
137 (1938).
In Courant v. International Photographers of Motion Pictures, Local 659, 176
F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1949) plaintiff invoked the treaty with Poland (1931) and the
U.N. Charter to substantiate his claim for'damages caused by defendant's denial
to accept him as a member. The court held that both international agreements "have
nothing to do with the problem here presented", finding that "the union activity
involved was not governmental in character" (1002), which position, taken alone,
seems doubtful since the interpretation of treaty law does not necessarily follow
rules of construction as developed in regard to the Constitution which admittedly
affects only relations between citizens on one side and the government on the other.
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with Costa Rica, 1851, Art. VII; with Argentina, 1853, Art. VIII).*"
Conventions adopted by the International Labor Conference and rati-
fied by the United States' contain uniform labor law' except one anti-
discriminatory provision already mentioned and a saving clause in favor of
local law where the latter "ensures more favorable conditions than those
187. independent Professions available to treaty aliens are listed in treaties asare limitations upon this privilege. The profession of merchant is open to treatyaliens in some treaties generally, while in others the privilege is limited to com-merce between the contracting countries. In some instances a general standard isset up, e.g., national treatment (e.g., treaty with China, 1946, Art. H, 2), most-favored-nation clause (e.'g., treaty with Greece, 1951, Art. VI, 2; Ethiopia, 1951,Art. VI, 1; Ireland, 1950, Art. 1, 1); or both standards combined (e.g., treaty withAustria, 1928, Art. 1, 1). Some treaties contained an express reservation in favorof local law (" ... carry on every form of economic activity which is not forbidden
by local law," treaty with Germany, 1923, Art. I, 1, repeated in treaties with ElSalvador, 1926, Art. I, 1, and Honduran, 1927, Art. I, 1). No standard is establishedin treaties with Colombia (1951, Art. I, 1), Denmark (1951, Art. 11, 1), Israel (1951,
Art. 11, 1) while the treaty with Uruguay (1951, Art. II, 1) contains the rule formu-lated differently (" :.. shall not engage in gainful occupations in contravention oflimitations expressly imposed, according to law, as a condition of their admit-tance," Art. V, 3). The recent treaty with.Japan (1953, Art. I, 1) adds to the listof permitted commercial activities the development and direction of enterprises
in which such treaty aliens "have invested." Wilson, Treaty-Merchant Clause inCommercial Treaties of the United States, 44 AM. J. INT'IL L. 145 (1950).
In regard to the so-called liberal professions some treaties contain a generalpermission in favor qf treaty to aliens (e.&., with Ethiopia, 1951. Art. VL 3:Uruguay, 1949, Art. V, combined with national treatment; Colombia, 1951, Art.VII, 1). Another group of' treaties excepts certain professions from such generalpermission, e.g., with respect to practice of law (treaty with Italy, 1948, Art. 1, 2;Ireland, 1951, Art. VI, Ia); practice of law, dentistry and pharmacy (treaty withGreece, 1951, Art. I). The third group of treaties exclude professions reserved,according to municipal law, to nationa s (e.g., treaty with China, 1946, Art. II, 2;Denmark, 1951, Art. VII, 3, granting national treatment except to professions whichare state licensed and "reserved by statute exclusively to citizens of the coun-try"). In some treaties even this impediment of aliengage is removed, e.g., in thetreaty with Israel (1951, Art. VIII, 2) which all other requirements as applicable tonationals, remain in force in regard to treaty aliens, Cf. Bearings before a Sabcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 38 (1952).The same rule is adopted in the treaty with Japan except that the privilege doesnot extend to the professions of notary public and port pilot (Protocol 5) and, ac-cording to a United States reservation, shall not extend to professions "which...
are state-licensed and reserved by statute or'constitution exclusively to citizens";on the other hand, Japan reserved the right to impose prohibitions or restrictionstothe same extent as States "to which such national belong, impose prohibitions orrestrictions on nationals of Japan with respect to practicing such professions."
Finally, it should be mentioned that activities of commercial travellers areregulated by special treaties (e.g.. with Guatetpala, 1918, 41 Star. 1669; El Salva-
bot, .1919; Panama, 1919; Venezuela, 1919),' d"iliese provisions are included intreaties of friendship, commerce, etc. (eg., Art. X of the treaty with Uruguay, 1949).Comment, International Law - Reservations to Commercial Treaties Dealing
with Alien's Right to Engage in the Profession, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1184 (1954);
Brause, Legislation Restricting the Participation of Aliens in the Professions and
Occupations, IMM. & NATUR. REP. 45 (April, 1953).
188. 54 STAT. 1683, 1693, 1707. DILLON, INTERNATION4AL LABOR CON-VENTIONS (1942); WEINFIRLD, LABOR TREATIES AND LABOR COMPACTS
7) Ray, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF LABOR RELATIONS, 2 LAs..J. 647 (1951). For Convention No. 74 (Certification of able seamen, 1946), see
TIAS 2949.
189. Cases involving these Conventions: Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S.511 (1949); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S, 724(1943); O'Donnell v. GreatLakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943); Smith v. United Statea, 176 F.2d 550
(948); Smith v. United States, The Robert Jordan, 167 F.2d 550 (4th Cit. 1948).wo additional cases ate cited in note 176, sopra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
provided by this Convention" (Art. 12 of the Convention concerning ship-
owners' liability). The same Convention contains additional reservations
in favor of local law in regard to exceptions to coverage (Art. 1, 1), med-
ical examination (Art. 2, 3), period of care (Art. 4, 2), compulsory social
insurance (Art. 4, 3), wages (Art. 5, 2), burial expenses (Art. 7, 2), safe-
guard of property (Art. 8) and settlement of disputes (Art. 9).
Moreover, conflict rules are included in international arrangements
concerning migratory workers, especially in relation to Mexico. t '" A simi-
tar convention with Costa Rica (1944) has been referred to above and its
conflict rule discussed.191 In the Agreement with Mexico concerning mi-
gration of Mexican agricultural workers (1948, 62 Stat. 3887) the rule of
non-discriminatory treatment is repeated (Executive Order of the President,
no. 9346, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109, 1943) guaranteeing such treatment with regard
to wages, occupational diseases and accident benefits "as enjoyed by
domestic agricultural workers under applicable state or federal legislation
of the United States" (15). On the contrary, this does not include minimum
wages because of lack on the part of federal authorities (i.e. the Depart-
ment of Labor), of "statutory authority" (24). The recent Bracero treaty
(1951)92 contains, with regard to working conditions of Mexican migratory
workers the undertaking by the United States to "exercise special vigi-
lance and its moral influence with state and local authorities, to the end
that Mexican workers may enjoy impartially and expeditiously the rights
which the laws of the United States grant to them" (Art. 35).193
It appears from the foregoing provisions that, in most instances, treaty
law follows the rule that employment contracts are governed by the law of
the place where work is done. This rule is also adopted with regard to
"conditions of employment and work, in particular wages, supplementary
payments and conditions for the protection of workers" in the Agreement
between parties to the NATO regarding the status of their forces (1951) by
providing that legal conditions of work "shall be those laid down by the
legislation of the receiving state," i.e., of the country where work is per-
formed (Art. IX, 4).
It only remains in this chapter to mention that during the last war,
enterpreneurs, domestic and foreign, were required, in order to qualify for
foreign procurement contracts (especially in Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and
Guatemala), to agree that they will comply with all local laws andregula-
tions affecting labor relations, hours of work, wages, unemployment; pay
locally prevailing wages, safeguard against accidents, etc." 4 A similar
190. Goot, Employment of Foreign Workers in United States Agriculture, 21
DEP'T STATE BULL. 43 (1949). United States - Mexico Agreement on Farm
Labor, 30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 467 (1953).
191. See 8k4I4AmI L.Q. 510, supra.
192. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2713 (1951). Cf. Goodwill Industries
of El Paso v. U.S. 218 F.2d 270 (5th Cit. 1954).
193. See 65 STAT. & 501 (1949) as amended. 119, 7 U.S.C. § 1461 seq.
194. Mathews, Labor Standards Provisions in ofovernment Foreign Procurement
Contracts, 42 ILL. L. REV. 141 (1947).
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method is used in our municipal law in connection with foreign invest-
ments; the Act for International Development (1950, 64 Stat. 204, 22 U.S.C.
Section 1557) provides that "investors... will observe local laws and will
provide adequate wages and working conditions for local labor.""
Transportation: By land. - The United States stayed away, for obvious
reasons, from important international agreements concerning transportation
by railways. As to transportation by road, a provision contained in the Con-
vention on the regulation of linteramerican automotive traffic (Washington,
1930, TIAS 1567) may be noted; operators of motor vehicles are "subject
to the traffic laws and regulations in force in that state or subdivision
thereof," meaning the lex loci.
By sea. - The Convention for unification of certain rules relating
to bills of lading (Brussels, 1924) enacted as the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (1936, '49 Stat. 1207) contains uniform substantive law.196
By air. - The Warsaw Convention (1929)1' created, for the most
part, uniform substantive law concerning liabilities of carriers engaged in
int~mational air transportion. In a general way, it is to be put forward that
these rules apply regardless of what cause of action is pleaded, in con-
tract or in tort, since the convention, in order to prevent any kind of le-
galistic jockeying for a more advantageous position, has flatly stated that
any action for damages "however founded" (Art. 24, 1) is subject to "con-
ditions and limitations" (Art. 17, 18, 19) as established by the. conven-
tion. The specific cause of action may be important only where, according
to the convention, municipal law controls; e.g., in situations where the
carrier is not entitled to invoke limitations of his liability; becadse he has
accepted passengers without regular ticket, or if the ticket lacked the pre-
scribed reference to the convention.'" One of these grounds, namely wil-
ful misconduct or default (Art. 25), is tied in with a conflict rule pre-
scribing how to characterize this notion (i.e., which "in accordance with
the law of the court to which the cate is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct").'
Another conflict rule inserted into the convention relates to contri-
butory negligence. As it was already pointed out, the court may, in such a
195, On problems ot social insurance, see supra Xl, 1; note the Agreement with
Canada (1942, 56 STAT. 1770).
196. KNAUTH. Tn AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN HILLS OF LADINO (1947).
197. GOEDHUIS, LA CONVENTION DE WARSOVIE (1933); same, NATIONAL
AIRLEGISLATION AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1937); Sullivan, Codifica-
tion of Air Carriers Liability by International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. I (1936);
Lathfors and Fennel, The International Conventions on Private Aerial Law, 8 .
AIR L. 298 (1938); De Vischer, Les Conflict des Lois en Matiere de Droig Aerien,
REcURIL DES COURS (Hague) I1, 279 (1934).
198. Grein v. Imperial Airways, 1 K.B. 50 (1937).
199. American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Goepp v. Ameri-
can Overseas Airlines, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep't 1952), also comment, I McGILL
L. REV. 231 (1953); Froman v. Pan American Airwhys, 1953 U.S. & Can. Av. Rep.
1; Horabin v. B.O.A.C., 2 All F.R. 1016 (1952), see note 269, infra, (next issue).
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case, deny or mitigate damages "according to its own law", i.e., the law
applicable lege fori, which may or may not allow such denial or mitiga-
tion (Art. 21). The lex fori will-also decide whether or not damages may
be awarded in periodical payments (Art. 22, 1). The question of who may
bring an action is left, according to the Convention (Art. 24, 2), to the law
applicable under the lex fori. "°0 On the contrary, the Convention expressly
authorizes that an action may be brought against the representative of the
carrier's estate in case of his death (Art. 27).
It may be added that parties (passengers and carriers) cannot, 'con-
tract-out' the Convention. According to an express provision (Art. 32)
"any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements... by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by the Conven-
tion ... by deciding the law applicable.., shall be null and void."
In conclusion, a general conflict rule, included in a considerable
number of treaties, may be registered making the law of the territory over
which the aircraft flies applicable ("The aircraft, their crews and passen-
gers and goods carried thereon, will, while within or over a territory to
which this Convention applies, be subject to the laws in force in that ter-
ritory, including all regulations relating to air traffic.. . the transportation
of passengers and goods, and public safety and order, as well as any regu-.
lation concerning immigration," treaties with Belgium, 1946, Art. V; Cana-
da, 1938, Art. IV; Denmark, 1934, Art. 5; France, 1939, Art. 5; Great Brit-
afn, 1935, Art. 4; Portugal, 1945, Art. VI; Switzerland, 1945, Art. 5, etc.).
This provision would indicate that, in relation between the contracting
countries, the principle of territoriality will prevail over that of the quasi-
nationality of the aircraft.
Note: This present study will be concluded in the next issue of the
Miami Law Quarterly.
200. See note 140 supra,
